The emerging thaw between India and China reflects a strategic recalibration shaped by geopolitical necessity, economic interdependence, and the unpredictable stance of Donald Trump’s United States.
A Shift from Confrontation to Cautious Cooperation
The Galwan clash of 2020, once a symbol of deep freeze in India-China ties, no longer dominates New Delhi’s agenda. India’s reactive bans, diplomatic offensives, and vocal anti-China stance have gradually given way to selective engagement. This pivot is not driven by trust, but pragmatism, shaped by the complexities of global power dynamics and India’s strategic hedging.
Despite Beijing’s backing of Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, India is now reciprocating China’s overtures—such as lifting the ban on tourist visas and restoring pilgrimages to Kailash Mansarovar—indicating that mutual interest has overtaken mutual suspicion, at least for now.
The Trump Factor
A crucial, if subtle, driver in this shift is Donald Trump’s America, which both India and China now see less as a partner and more as a preacher or disruptor. Trump's protectionist agenda, including a proposed 500% tariff on nations trading with Russia, and his opportunistic posturing during recent crises (India-Pakistan, Russia-Ukraine), have created space for regional alternatives and alignments.
While India once envisioned the U.S. as a cornerstone of its strategic future, disillusionment is setting in. As Prof. Christopher Clary notes, India “was not getting the support it expected from Washington.”
The Economics of Realism
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India runs an $85 billion trade deficit with China, heavily reliant on imports of electronics, machinery, and chemical inputs.
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Meanwhile, China needs access to India's market and seeks to avoid a two-front hostility scenario involving both India and the U.S.-led West.
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NITI Aayog’s recent recommendation to allow Chinese companies to acquire up to 24% stake in Indian firms without prior approval shows that economic interdependence is quietly pushing policy adjustments.
While this doesn’t signal a rollback of the Atmanirbhar Bharat policy, it suggests India is open to selective cooperation—especially where its domestic industries are not yet self-sufficient.
Diplomatic Signaling and the RIC Revival
The Jaishankar-Xi handshake during the SCO meet, along with Rajnath Singh’s visit to China—the first by a defence minister in over a decade—are unmistakable signs of reopening diplomatic channels. Talks on a structured roadmap for LAC de-escalation and the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) troika underline a push for multipolar stability, with Moscow mediating.
China’s support for RIC and Russia’s enthusiasm for it as a counter to U.S. dominance point to a tentative shift toward regional cooperation, albeit with cautious footwork.
The Big Picture: Strategic Hedge, Not Strategic Surrender
India's pivot is not an abandonment of its long-held security concerns—it remains wary of Chinese intentions and is diversifying its defense and technology partnerships. But it is hedging against global unpredictability, not least from the U.S.
As Happymon Jacob aptly puts it, “Geopolitical loneliness can be more costly than the boredom of tiresome summitry.” India, therefore, is engaging China to avoid isolation and preserve its strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
The India-China thaw is not built on trust or reconciliation—it is built on compulsion, calculation, and a shared interest in managing instability. Trump’s transactional diplomacy and the weakening global order have nudged Asia’s giants to talk again. The handshakes are guarded, the cooperation is limited, but the direction is clear: a pragmatic pause in hostilities, not an end to rivalry.
