As External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar heads to Moscow for a high-stakes meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, India stands at the eye of an intensifying diplomatic storm. The trigger has been a dramatic escalation in economic coercion from the United States under President Trump, who has launched his harshest trade and sanctions campaign against New Delhi in years. Washington’s aim is unmistakable—forcing India to dilute or sever its deepening strategic and economic partnership with Moscow. For a country that prizes autonomy in foreign policy, the pressure represents not just an external challenge but a defining test of its long-term global role.
The campaign began in August 2025, when the United States imposed sweeping 25% tariffs on Indian exports, striking a blow at industries heavily reliant on the American market. Soon afterwards, Trump doubled down, raising the tariffs to 50% on goods linked to Russian oil imports. The consequences are severe: nearly 70% of India’s exports to the US now face punitive duties, hitting sectors that range from agriculture to IT services and small-scale manufacturing. The economic pain threatens to ripple across India’s domestic economy, leaving farmers, exporters, and industrial producers caught in the crossfire of global geopolitics.
Tariffs, however, are only part of Washington’s toolkit. The far more menacing threat comes from potential secondary sanctions. By warning India that its continued energy and defence partnerships with Moscow could cut it off from dollar-dominated financial networks, the US is forcing New Delhi into a stark choice: preserve access to the global financial system or maintain ties with its most enduring strategic partner. This form of coercion raises fears of a repeat of the Iranian oil episode, where India’s early defiance ultimately gave way under similar threats of financial isolation.
The precedent of Iran still looms large. When Washington abandoned the nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions, India initially held firm, declaring unilateral sanctions illegitimate. Yet, over time, Iranian oil, once central to India’s energy mix, disappeared from Indian imports under American pressure. Critics now argue that India’s defiance against the Russian measures may similarly erode if the costs mount too high. But unlike the Iran case, Russia occupies an entirely different place in India’s strategic calculus, making capitulation less conceivable.
Russia is not just another energy supplier—it is the backbone of India’s defence architecture. Between 60% and 70% of India’s weapons systems are of Russian origin, from fighter aircraft and submarines to the S-400 missile defence systems, which remain crucial to India’s deterrence posture. On the energy front, Russia has in recent years overtaken other suppliers to become India’s largest source of crude oil, providing more than one-third of its imports at discounted rates that are critical for domestic inflation control. The embedded nature of this partnership makes any severing of ties not merely difficult but potentially destabilising for India’s national security.
India also points to the glaring double standards in Washington’s stance. China, which imports even more Russian oil and gas, has faced relatively less economic coercion. This selective enforcement, critics argue, exposes the geopolitical motives underlying US actions. By portraying itself as a middle power unfairly singled out, India is seeking to galvanise sympathy among its BRICS partners and across the wider Global South, where resentment toward Western economic dominance runs deep.
Against this backdrop, the Jaishankar-Lavrov talks in Moscow acquire immense significance. They are not merely about bilateral ties but about signalling to the world that India and Russia are exploring alternatives to the dollar-based global order. Plans for rupee-ruble trade settlement and non-dollar payment channels are already underway, as both sides seek to insulate their partnership from Western sanctions. Russian officials, including Deputy Chief of Mission Roman Babushkin, have already reassured New Delhi of Moscow’s readiness to stand firm against external pressures.
Meanwhile, India faces growing domestic pressures. Exporters who rely on the US market are already feeling the crunch, while farmers and small industries warn of rising losses. Opposition parties have seized the moment to question the government’s handling of the crisis, demanding relief for affected sectors. Yet Prime Minister Modi has sought to project resolve, declaring that India will not compromise its autonomy or the welfare of its citizens for short-term diplomatic concessions, even if it means enduring painful economic costs.
New Delhi’s broader strategy appears to rest on three pillars: public defiance of American sanctions, diversification of markets to reduce dependence on the US, and acceleration of overdue economic reforms to strengthen domestic resilience. The gamble is high-risk: India must endure near-term pain to secure long-term independence in a multipolar order. Whether this approach succeeds will depend not only on its ability to withstand economic pressure but also on its capacity to align with other nations similarly wary of American financial dominance.
Ultimately, the stakes are far larger than tariffs or oil shipments. At the core lies India’s assertion that sovereign nations should not be subjected to extraterritorial sanctions imposed unilaterally by another power. The outcome of this confrontation will go a long way in shaping not only the future of India-US relations but also India’s standing as an autonomous power in a world increasingly defined by contestation between great powers and the rise of alternative economic systems.
