Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit to India, marked by his meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, reflects a cautious yet deliberate attempt by both countries to stabilise ties after years of turbulence. The visit comes at a time when US-India relations are under strain due to President Donald Trump’s tariff hikes, which doubled duties on Indian goods to 50%. However, framing the India-China engagement as a sudden reaction to Washington’s economic moves oversimplifies a far deeper, long-running process of diplomatic recalibration that began after the 2017 Doklam standoff and was severely tested by the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020–2021.
The trajectory of India-China relations since Doklam has been shaped by confrontation, disengagement, and silent diplomacy. The 2018 Wuhan and 2019 Mammalapuram informal summits between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping had set a precedent for quiet, leader-driven dialogue. Yet the Galwan clash plunged ties to their lowest point in decades, leading India to ban Chinese apps, tighten investment scrutiny, and accelerate frontier infrastructure. Even so, both sides avoided breaking communication channels. Over 21 rounds of military talks and 17 meetings under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) have taken place, while multilateral platforms such as the SCO and BRICS provided opportunities for engagement. This persistence in dialogue has ensured that even amid a crisis, diplomacy remained alive.
Wang Yi’s New Delhi, ahead of Modi’s planned participation in the upcoming SCO summit in China, carried symbolic and practical significance. The two countries agreed to reopen border trade, resume direct flights, expand the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and establish new mechanisms for managing border tensions. Jaishankar stressed that resolving the border issue is fundamental for any positive momentum, a point echoed by the Chinese side. This underscores how pragmatism continues to be the pivot of the relationship: both nations understand that their border disputes remain a live fault line, yet neither wishes for perpetual confrontation.
Since Galwan, phased disengagement at Pangong Tso in 2021 and Gogra-Hot Springs in 2022 has reduced some friction points, while the 2024 border patrolling pact between Modi and Xi provided a framework for avoiding direct clashes. Symbolism has accompanied substance—Xi’s call for a “dragon-elephant tango” and Rajnath Singh’s 2025 Qingdao visit reinforced the desire for a “structured roadmap” of de-escalation. At the same time, India remains wary, particularly after Operation Sindoor exposed the China-Pakistan military nexus and Beijing’s growing footprint in the Indian Ocean.
Economic interdependence is another powerful driver. India relies heavily on Chinese imports, from electronics and chemicals to rare earths, while China sees India as a vast consumer market, especially as its access to the US is complicated by geopolitical competition. Trump’s tariff war with both New Delhi and Beijing has added urgency to their rapprochement, but has not created it. Indeed, for Beijing, the strains in US-India ties bring strategic comfort, as they potentially dilute the Quad’s cohesion. Russia, too, is leveraging this moment to revive the Russia-India-China troika, seeing it as a means to strengthen multipolarity and counterbalance Washington.
Thus, what may appear as sudden bonhomie between India and China is, in reality, the result of a sustained process of cautious engagement, rooted in post-Doklam pragmatism, tested by Galwan, and carried forward by consistent backchannel and high-level diplomacy. Trump’s tariffs may have accelerated the pace, but they are only one factor in a much larger and longer story of two Asian giants managing rivalry, interdependence, and the imperative of stability.
