The massive protests that have engulfed Nepal, leaving at least 20 people dead, have erupted at a politically sensitive moment. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli had only recently returned from a significant diplomatic trip to China and was preparing to embark on another high-profile visit to India. These demonstrations, largely led by the country’s Gen Z population, appear at first glance to be spontaneous uprisings. However, experts caution that while the anger on the streets is genuine, the timing and scale of the unrest make it vulnerable to manipulation by larger international forces engaged in geopolitical competition, particularly between China and the United States. For India, the developments in its immediate neighborhood carry deeper significance, as the Himalayan nation has historically been a ground where diverse external powers compete for influence.
The protests, which entered their second day on Tuesday, did not simply materialize overnight. Frustration against Oli’s leadership had been growing steadily among young Nepalis, who are deeply dissatisfied with issues such as corruption, nepotism, unemployment, and the lack of opportunities at home, which in turn has fueled mass migration. The trigger for the outburst was the Oli government’s controversial move to ban social media applications, a decision that was widely seen as an attack on free speech. However, weeks earlier, social media itself had already been abuzz with discussions around “nepo kids” and “nepo babies,” pointing to a larger discontent about the entrenched privilege and inequality within Nepali politics. Thus, when the government’s ban was announced, it ignited anger that had been simmering for months.
The demonstrations quickly turned violent, with young people, including school and college students in uniform, clashing with security forces across major Nepali cities. By Monday evening, at least 20 people had lost their lives, and the unrest showed no signs of abating. To contain the situation, the government imposed a strict curfew in key urban centers, including Kathmandu, but the restrictions failed to calm public anger. As the pressure mounted, Prime Minister Oli was forced to tender his resignation, signaling how serious the crisis had become. For many observers, the protests are more than just a reaction to one decision—they represent a broader rejection of a political class that has repeatedly failed to deliver stability and progress.
Veteran journalist Keshav Pradhan, who has spent decades covering Nepal, SAARC, and China-Tibet affairs, emphasized that while the demonstrations may seem sudden, they are rooted in deep-seated frustrations. According to him, it would be premature to directly link the protests to foreign involvement, yet the fluid and fragile state of Nepali politics makes the country an easy target for external forces looking to assert influence. Pradhan also pointed to the visible messaging at the protests: placards and chants were less about geopolitical concerns and more about bread-and-butter issues such as corruption, youth unemployment, and governance failures. He noted that young YouTubers and influencers had been consistently calling out Oli’s government over everyday problems, ranging from poorly maintained roads to the exodus of Nepali youth in search of work abroad.
Still, the timing of the unrest cannot be overlooked. Oli’s resignation and the eruption of street anger came just as he was preparing for a crucial diplomatic visit to India. Only days earlier, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri had been in Kathmandu, extending a formal invitation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Oli’s travel schedule suggested that he would likely be in India on September 16, following his high-profile attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China. Experts have underlined how unusual it was that Oli chose Beijing as the destination for his first foreign trip after becoming Prime Minister in July 2024, breaking a long-standing tradition where Nepali leaders usually prioritized India. This departure was seen as a deliberate tilt toward China, further complicating Nepal’s delicate balancing act between its two powerful neighbors.
Nepal’s current political turmoil has also sparked comparisons with Bangladesh’s recent upheaval. In mid-2024, what began as a student-led protest in Bangladesh snowballed into a movement that eventually toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, long viewed as a pro-India leader. Nepal, like Bangladesh, occupies a critical position in South Asia’s strategic landscape, making it particularly vulnerable to the competing interests of China and the United States. Oli’s government, for instance, signed a framework agreement to join Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative in December 2024, signaling a deepening of ties with China. At the same time, Washington has committed $500 million through the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Nepal Compact to fund infrastructure development, embedding its own interests in the country. This overlap of major power projects has effectively turned Nepal into a battleground for influence, raising the stakes of every political crisis.
Oli himself has not shied away from controversial statements that strained ties with India. Just last month, during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, he asserted that the Lipulekh Pass—an area India considers an integral part of its territory—actually belongs to Nepal. His claim revived old disputes that date back to the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli and echoed his protests in 2020 over Uttarakhand’s Kalapani and Limpiyadhura regions. Such rhetoric not only fuels nationalist sentiment within Nepal but also complicates relations with India at a time when New Delhi is wary of China’s expanding footprint in its neighborhood.
As protests spread rapidly beyond Kathmandu into districts like Jhapa, Sunsari, Bhairahawa, and Biratnagar—many of them lying close to the Indian border—the scale of public anger became undeniable. Since the monarchy was abolished in 2008, Nepal has cycled through 13 different governments, yet none have succeeded in delivering the governance, development, or accountability that citizens demand. The repeated failures of successive administrations have left ordinary Nepalis disillusioned and resentful, paving the way for today’s widespread upheaval. Some of the demonstrations even carried undertones of nostalgia forthe monarchy, with King Gyanendra Shah’s supporters using the opportunity to amplify their voices.
Internationally, speculation abounds about who may be pulling the strings of Nepal’s crisis. Some argue that Oli’s perceived pro-China stance has provoked American interference, similar to dynamics in Bangladesh. Others suggest that Beijing might be encouraging the unrest to counter U.S. investments under the MCC Compact. A third theory links the youth-led uprising to monarchist forces, who have historically been closer to India. The flood of competing narratives, including sudden media reports tying the crisis to Washington, Beijing, and even conspiracy theories about “deep state” involvement, has only added to the confusion. Yet Pradhan warns against drawing hasty conclusions. He contends that China, in particular, would be wary of instigating unrest that could spiral out of its control, recalling how anti-China sentiment in Nepal boiled over in the 1960s.
Ultimately, the current turmoil underscores the fragile state of Nepal’s democracy, where domestic grievances easily intersect with international rivalries. With Oli’s resignation and the protests spreading across key regions, the country once again finds itself at a crossroads. The speed at which the demonstrations escalated raises critical questions not only about the failures of governance but also about how external powers might seek to shape Nepal’s trajectory in the months ahead.
