Former CIA officer John Kiriakou has made startling claims about U.S. influence over Pakistan during the tenure of former President Pervez Musharraf, asserting that Washington effectively gained control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal through financial incentives. Kiriakou, who spent 15 years in the CIA, including as chief of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, revealed these insights in an interview with ANI, where he detailed how the U.S. “purchased” Musharraf with millions in aid, granting it extensive access to Pakistan’s military and security apparatus.
According to Kiriakou, Musharraf’s cooperation allowed the United States near-unrestricted operational oversight, including military and economic initiatives, in exchange for continued aid. “The United States loves working with dictators. You don’t have to worry about public opinion or the media. We essentially just purchased Musharraf,” he said. However, he cautioned that Musharraf maintained a dual approach: publicly aligning with the U.S. on counterterrorism, while covertly permitting Pakistan’s military and extremist groups to conduct terror activities targeting India. “The Pakistani military didn’t care about Al-Qaeda; they cared about India. Musharraf pretended to side with the U.S. on counterterrorism while committing terror against India,” Kiriakou stated.
Kiriakou also highlighted the role of Saudi Arabia in shielding Pakistan’s nuclear program. He revealed that the U.S. abandoned plans to target Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, after direct intervention from Riyadh. “If we had taken the Israeli approach, we would have just killed him. He was easy enough to find. But the Saudis came to us and said, ‘Please leave him alone. We like AQ Khan. We’re working with him.” He described this as a major policy mistake, suggesting that Saudi Arabia’s interest in protecting Khan might have been tied to its own ambitions for a nuclear capability. Kiriakou connected this to recent Saudi–Pakistani defense pacts, hinting that Riyadh may now be “calling in its investment.”
Beyond Pakistan, Kiriakou criticised U.S. foreign policy for its selective morality. He argued that Washington routinely works with autocrats while projecting itself as a champion of democracy and human rights. “We like to pretend we’re a beacon of democracy and human rights. But it’s just not true — we do what benefits us that day,” he said. He described the U.S.–Saudi relationship as purely transactional, revolving around oil purchases and weapons sales. He recalled a Saudi guard telling him, “You are hired help. We paid for you to come here and defend us.”
Kiriakou concluded by reflecting on the broader shifts in global power. He noted that strategic influence is moving away from the United States toward emerging powers like China, India, and Saudi Arabia, signaling a transformation in international relations. “We’re sitting on an ocean of oil. We don’t need the Saudis anymore. They’re hedging their bets, improving relations with China and India. We’re witnessing a transformation in how the world operates,” he remarked.
These revelations underscore the complex interplay of nuclear diplomacy, geopolitical maneuvering, and transactional alliances in South Asia, highlighting the opaque strategies employed by the U.S. to maintain influence over critical security assets while balancing regional conflicts and global partnerships. Kiriakou’s disclosures also cast light on the often-hidden role of external powers, like Saudi Arabia, in shaping the strategic calculus of nuclear proliferation and counterterrorism policies in the region.
