Pakistan’s agricultural system is entering a phase of extreme vulnerability, as highlighted by the Ecological Threat Report 2025 released by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The study points to a structural crisis that is deepened by geopolitical shifts, climate instability, and hydrological dependence. Pakistan relies on the Indus basin for the majority of its agricultural needs, and approximately eighty percent of cultivated land in the country depends on river-fed irrigation. The report underscores that Pakistan’s limited water storage capability leaves it exposed to fluctuations that might seem minor on a technical scale but are devastating in practice. With dams capable of storing only about thirty days of Indus water flows, the margin for error or interruption is extraordinarily narrow, placing critical pressure on food security, rural livelihoods, and national stability.
This scenario has been further complicated by recent political developments. After the Pahalgam terror attack in April, India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, which effectively paused its formal obligations to share water from the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. While India remains constrained by engineering realities and cannot fully block the rivers, it retains the technical capacity to adjust timing and flow management at key moments. According to the report, even these calibrated shifts can create significant shortages downstream, particularly during summer months when demand peaks and agricultural activity intensifies across Pakistan’s major plains.
Recent developments on the ground provide a vivid demonstration of this leverage. In May, India undertook reservoir flushing operations at the Salal and Baglihar dams without notifying Pakistan, an event that led to a sudden combination of drying riverbeds followed by sediment-laden surges in Punjab province. These operations, normally conducted every few years to maintain dam safety and power efficiency, showed how procedural hydrological actions can carry strategic weight when diplomatic agreements are suspended. Pakistan’s limited reservoir space prevents it from cushioning such temporary interruptions, placing its agrarian communities at immediate risk.
Beyond India, regional dynamics are further tightening Pakistan’s water landscape. Afghanistan has moved ahead with plans to construct a dam on the Kunar River, adding another layer of supply pressure. With the Taliban leadership publicly emphasising this infrastructure push, Pakistan now faces simultaneous upstream interventions on different hydrological fronts. Such developments amplify concerns that water scarcity could evolve into a broader geopolitical trigger in South Asia, where climate challenges already strain national systems.
Meanwhile, India continues to expand its water utilisation efforts at home. For years, substantial portions of the eastern rivers allotted to India under the treaty flowed unused into Pakistan. Under current policy directions, India has accelerated dam and hydropower development to fully deploy its entitlement, including the completion of the Shahpurkandi project and rapid progress on other planned structures. The report suggests this marks a shift from passive treaty compliance to assertive resource management. As India boosts its water infrastructure, Pakistan’s structural inadequacies become more pronounced, revealing how strategic decisions taken upstream can critically shape downstream realities.
The report ultimately concludes that Pakistan's agricultural and water future is tightly tied to decisions beyond its immediate control. Climate volatility, upstream infrastructure expansion, and diplomatic rifts compound each other, making water one of the most sensitive levers in regional relations. With very limited storage capacity and rising demand pressures, Pakistan faces the risk that even short disruptions could cascade into food supply strain, economic distress, and heightened internal instability.
