Months after its brief but intense confrontation with India, Pakistan is undertaking one of the most significant structural changes to its military command system in decades. The government in Islamabad is preparing to introduce a new constitutional post — the Commander of Defence Forces (CDF) — aimed at unifying the command of the army, navy, and air force under a single authority. Officially, the move is being justified as an effort to improve coordination and efficiency across the armed services, but political observers believe it will further strengthen the military’s grip over the state while eroding civilian control.
The proposed reform, inspired by what Pakistan calls “lessons learned” from its military standoff with India in May, is being pursued through the 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill. This amendment would modify Article 243 of the Pakistani Constitution, which currently vests supreme command of the armed forces in the President and control in the federal government. Under the new structure, the CDF would assume overarching operational authority over all branches of the military, effectively consolidating power at the top of the defence hierarchy.
Defence Minister Khawaja Asif confirmed that consultations were underway to redefine Pakistan’s military command laws. He said that the move reflects “evolving defence requirements” and is meant to strengthen joint planning and operations. However, the official draft of the amendment has yet to be made public, fueling speculation that it may reduce the Prime Minister’s and President’s influence over national defence decisions. Critics argue that this will formalise what has long been a de facto reality — that Pakistan’s military operates autonomously, often overshadowing its civilian leadership.
The timing of the reform is crucial. Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir is due to retire later this month, but the creation of the new post could extend his influence under a new title. Munir, who has played a central role in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy since assuming command, is widely expected to become the first Commander of Defence Forces. The move would mirror India’s creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position in 2019, although Pakistan’s version would be far more powerful and constitutionally protected.
Pakistan’s decision follows its brief but damaging military encounter with India earlier this year. During the four-day conflict, India launched precision strikes under Operation Sindoor targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The strikes, carried out with a high degree of coordination between India’s army, air force, and navy, exposed the lack of jointness and slow response mechanisms within Pakistan’s military. The episode reportedly forced Pakistan’s top brass to acknowledge the urgent need for a unified command structure to counter modern warfare challenges.
Politically, the move risks deepening Pakistan’s long-standing civil-military imbalance. The ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and supported by President Asif Ali Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has shown cautious approval for the constitutional amendment. The PPP, which initially resisted, has now signalled conditional support. Still, opposition parties and independent analysts warn that the amendment will institutionalise military dominance in the country’s governance system, turning the armed forces’ informal supremacy into a constitutional fact.
For decades, Pakistan’s military has been seen as the ultimate arbiter of power, influencing government transitions, foreign policy, and even judicial decisions. The introduction of the Commander of Defence Forces could transform this unofficial influence into a legally sanctioned authority. It marks a decisive shift in Pakistan’s political structure — not through a coup, as in the past, but through constitutional engineering that legitimises the army’s preeminence.
Internationally, the development is being watched closely. A unified command could improve Pakistan’s operational efficiency but might also centralise decision-making in ways that heighten regional instability. For India, it signals a more cohesive but militarised neighbour, one that has institutionalised its defence apparatus after a recent defeat. For Western allies, it raises concerns about the future of Pakistan’s fragile democracy, which now appears to be yielding even more ground to its generals.
In essence, Pakistan is on the verge of rewriting the unwritten rule that has governed it for decades — that the military is the state’s true centre of gravity. This time, however, it will not be hidden behind the curtain of politics but etched directly into the text of its Constitution.
