Pakistan is estimated to maintain a nuclear arsenal of roughly 170 warheads, with the core focus placed on regional deterrence and the deployment of short-range and tactical nuclear systems. India has reiterated that it remains committed to its declared no-first-use nuclear policy, while simultaneously stressing that it will not succumb to any form of nuclear intimidation and will take every measure it considers necessary to protect national security interests. These reaffirmations followed heightened tensions after Operation Sindoor and renewed global attention on South Asia’s nuclear posture.
On November 3, 2025, United States President Donald Trump stated that Pakistan was allegedly carrying out secret nuclear tests, suggesting that such covert activity justified a shift in U.S. nuclear policy. His assertion, if independently verified, would magnify existing international alarm regarding nuclear proliferation and stability in South Asia. The claim triggered swift diplomatic reactions and added pressure on Pakistan’s strategic transparency.
India strongly rejected what it described as Pakistan’s attempt at nuclear brinkmanship. Indian authorities stated that the country remains committed to its responsible nuclear doctrine, including the no-first-use policy, yet will respond resolutely to any provocation threatening national security. Officials pointed to Operation Sindoor, launched after the Pahalgam terror attack, claiming it resulted in considerable damage to Pakistani air installations. India emphasized that deterrence, restraint, and preparedness remain central to its nuclear posture even while messaging firmness against escalation.
Open-source intelligence and strategic studies estimate that Pakistan possesses about 170 nuclear warheads, though these figures include uncertainties linked to deployment readiness, reserve stockpiles, and delivery-system integration. A significant share of Pakistan’s nuclear capability is delivered through land-based missile systems, supplemented by air-launched assets and a very limited emerging sea-based component intended to support second-strike credibility. Analysts note that while the total number is substantial, not all warheads are believed to be deployed or operational at any given time.
Pakistan’s air-delivery capability primarily relies on Mirage III and Mirage V fighter aircraft, platforms that have been associated with nuclear missions for several decades. These jets are believed to carry free-fall nuclear bombs or air-launched Ra’ad cruise missiles. The JF-17 fighter, though occasionally linked to nuclear-weapon integration in unofficial reports, has not been conclusively confirmed as a regular nuclear-delivery system.
On land, Pakistan deploys a mix of ballistic and cruise missile systems that cover varying ranges. Short-range missiles such as Abdali (Hatf-2) and Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) are thought to support battlefield nuclear roles, while medium-range missiles like Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-II expand strike capability deeper into the region. The Shaheen-III missile, with an estimated range of approximately 2,750 km, represents Pakistan’s longest-range system but still falls short of intercontinental capability. Tactical systems like the Nasr missile, designed for very short-range battlefield use, underscore Pakistan’s emphasis on flexible response options in a conventional conflict scenario.
Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear capability remains limited and is centered on the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile, first tested in 2017 with an estimated range of around 450 km. While symbolic of an effort to develop a second-strike option, this capability is still in an early stage and lacks the scale and survivability associated with established submarine-based nuclear forces in other nuclear-armed states.
Despite expanding delivery platforms, Pakistan’s nuclear forces face constraints. Several missile systems rely on older liquid-fuel propulsion, which requires longer launch-preparation times and increases vulnerability to pre-emptive strikes. Analysts also note concerns about the survivability of fixed storage and launch infrastructure, particularly in the context of precision-strike capabilities reportedly demonstrated by India during Operation Sindoor.
Strategic stability in South Asia remains sensitive and volatile. Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons and rapid-response missiles introduces greater complexity into crisis-management scenarios, while India’s doctrine, though rooted in no-first-use, includes commitments to overwhelming retaliation if attacked with nuclear weapons. Persistent cross-border tensions, periodic militant incidents, and accelerated military responses amplify the risk of miscalculation.
Analysts caution that without strong diplomatic channels, crisis-communication mechanisms, and sustained monitoring by international institutions, the region remains susceptible to escalation risks. Both countries’ nuclear doctrines, coupled with political tensions and fast-evolving military technologies, make South Asia one of the most precarious nuclear flashpoints in the world today.
