Bangladesh is entering a turbulent and unpredictable chapter, with the political landscape fracturing further after Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League declared that it will boycott the upcoming national elections. The party’s blistering statement accused Muhammad Yunus’s interim administration of functioning as a “killer-fascist” regime and claimed that no free or credible election is possible under its authority. This rejection has widened an already dangerous political rift and is pushing the country toward a prolonged period of instability.
The Awami League’s denunciation followed the announcement of the election schedule by Chief Election Commissioner AMM Nasir Uddin. The party insisted that the current administration lacks neutrality and is incapable of ensuring a transparent electoral environment. With Bangladesh’s single largest political force refusing to participate, the legitimacy of the February 12, 2026, election has been thrown into question.
The implications of this standoff are profound. Bangladesh now faces the possibility of severe civil unrest as mistrust between political actors deepens and state institutions remain paralysed. Millions of Awami League supporters feel disenfranchised, and with no dialogue or compromise emerging, the country risks sliding toward a confrontation that could resemble a civil war. For India, which shares an expansive and porous border with Bangladesh, the destabilisation next door carries serious security ramifications.
Compounding the volatility is the Yunus government’s decision to bar the Awami League from contesting the election. Excluding a party that has governed Bangladesh for more than two decades and won nine national polls has removed a crucial stabilising force from the political process. In its absence, the electoral contest will largely involve the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami, both long-standing rivals of the Awami League.
The crisis is now spilling beyond domestic politics, with Yunus’s administration increasingly adopting an adversarial posture toward India. Sheikh Hasina’s death sentence — issued by a Dhaka tribunal for her handling of the 2024 student protests — has further strained relations. Dhaka’s formal request that New Delhi extradite the ousted leader, who has been residing in India, has transformed the issue into a geopolitical pressure tool.
In a troubling shift, Bangladesh’s foreign policy advisers have recently indicated alignment with Pakistan and China. Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain openly supported Islamabad’s proposal for a trilateral grouping with Beijing and Dhaka, even suggesting that a regional bloc excluding India was “strategically possible.” This marks a stark departure from decades of cooperation between India and Bangladesh and signals Dhaka’s willingness to recalibrate its strategic orientation.
By moving closer to the Beijing-Islamabad axis, Bangladesh is leveraging its political turmoil to assert pressure on India and explore alliances contrary to New Delhi’s security interests. Pakistan’s renewed outreach to Bangladesh, combined with the instability created by the Yunus-led caretaker regime, presents a challenge India cannot afford to overlook.
The country’s internal fissures and shifting external alignments suggest that Bangladesh is headed into a phase of heightened uncertainty — one that threatens not just its own political cohesion, but also the security and strategic balance of the wider region.
