The collapse of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024 initially positioned the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as the undisputed favourite to form the next government. For more than a year, analysts widely believed that the promised February 2026 election — announced by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus — would deliver a decisive BNP victory. That assumption no longer holds. A new survey by the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI) shows the fundamental shift underway: 33% of respondents said they were “very likely” to vote for the BNP, while 29% expressed the same preference for the once-banned Jamaat-e-Islami. On the broader question of public approval, Jamaat was “liked” by 53% of participants, slightly ahead of the BNP at 51%. With just a four-percentage-point gap between the two parties, the electoral race has tightened dramatically, and the momentum is trending in Jamaat’s favour.
The resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami has been building steadily on the ground. Its student wing — Islami Chhatra Shibir — swept the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union election in September, an outcome that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. The victory was followed by major wins across other major universities, including Jahangirnagar, Rajshahi, and Chittagong. These results reflect strong organisational expansion, deep local outreach, and ideological consolidation. Jamaat’s internal structure — second only to the Awami League in discipline and cadre strength — has allowed it to mobilise more effectively than the BNP, whose leadership is currently fragmented. With Khaleda Zia critically ill and heir-apparent Tarique Rahman still abroad and facing assassination risks if he returns to Dhaka, BNP suffers from a leadership vacuum just when cohesion is most needed.
Several developments explain why Jamaat is gaining ground. A section of citizens — particularly the business community and moderate Islamists who traditionally leaned toward the BNP — are increasingly uneasy about BNP cadres engaging in extortion and land-grabbing in anticipation of electoral power. As a result, some of the anti-incumbency directed against Hasina’s Awami League has transferred to the BNP. Jamaat has simultaneously been engaged in a strategic image-building campaign, positioning itself as a self-appointed protector against post-Hasina law-and-order breakdowns, particularly for Hindus and other vulnerable groups. With the police force still depleted and overstretched since the unrest of 2024, Jamaat’s street-level conflict resolution has earned goodwill among communities that previously distrusted it.
The survey numbers also reflect changing political moods. The BNP has been banking on early elections due to fears that public anger against the Hasina regime will diminish with time, and that calculation is proving accurate. Meanwhile, Jamaat is pushing for major electoral reforms before national polling, signalling confidence that time is on its side. The Jamaat’s historic vote shares — 4.28% in the last free election in 2008 and 6.03% in 1970 — would normally discount its chance of leading a government. But Bangladesh’s current political vacuum, the collapse of the Awami League from the electoral landscape, and Jamaat’s rapid organisational mobilisation have reconfigured the contest far faster than expected.
The implications for India are significant. Bangladesh’s strategic direction is central to India’s northeast, counter-terror infrastructure, border security, and the Bay of Bengal maritime landscape. The 2001–2006 BNP–Jamaat coalition period was a major security crisis for New Delhi, with the use of Bangladeshi territory by anti-India extremist groups, arms trafficking, and cross-border militant infiltration. The 10-truck arms seizure of 2004 remains one of the most prominent examples — a consignment widely believed to be destined for insurgent groups in India’s northeast. Several Jamaat functionaries with deep ties to Pakistan’s ISI were later convicted for wartime atrocities during 1971 but were released after Hasina’s fall.
The final months before the February 2026 election are expected to be volatile. Student-driven unrest that toppled the Hasina government continues to fracture the political landscape. Key voter blocs, including minorities and urban moderates, remain undecided and could swing the result late. With the Awami League barred from contesting for now, the absence of the party that once formed the core of India’s strategic comfort zone in Dhaka increases uncertainty.
India will maintain diplomatic engagement with whichever leadership Bangladesh elects, but a Jamaat-led government would represent a sharp departure from the past 15 years of bilateral cooperation. New Delhi will need to prepare for all outcomes — from a BNP win to a Jamaat surge large enough to form or dominate the next coalition. The survey numbers show that Bangladesh’s political centre of gravity is shifting quickly, and the margin for error in analysing the road to 2026 has narrowed dramatically.
