Pakistan’s proposal for a China-backed regional bloc is generating intense debate across South Asia, signalling a potential shift in the region’s geopolitical architecture. The initiative, floated by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, builds on emerging cooperation between Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. Dar described the effort as a “variable geometry” framework—flexible, issue-based partnerships that could eventually draw in other South Asian states. In effect, it resembles a SAARC-like platform but one deliberately structured to operate without India.
Dar maintains publicly that the bloc is not meant to rival or confront India, yet the political context suggests otherwise. SAARC has been largely defunct for nearly a decade because India–Pakistan tensions repeatedly stalled summits and blocked initiatives. Relations between the two nuclear neighbours have deteriorated further, including a brief but dramatic four-day air engagement this year. With SAARC paralysed, Pakistan sees an opening to champion a new model of regional cooperation—one that sidesteps India entirely.
Bangladesh’s shifting foreign policy has strengthened the momentum. Dhaka’s ties with New Delhi have deteriorated sharply since Sheikh Hasina’s exit from power, creating a vacuum that China has quickly stepped in to fill. The timing of confidential meetings involving Pakistan, Bangladesh and China has fuelled speculation that Beijing is encouraging the formation of a new regional grouping that dilutes India’s influence in its neighbourhood.
The rationale is clear: South Asia, home to over two billion people, remains one of the world’s least integrated regions, with intra-regional trade hovering around a mere 5 per cent. Analysts argue that decades of India–Pakistan hostility have cost the region billions in lost trade, stalled infrastructure projects and undermined connectivity. Smaller nations—Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives—have consistently pushed for deeper regional cooperation on climate, energy and economic development. With SAARC stalled, some may be open to exploratory talks, particularly if China-backed financing is on the table.
But India remains the decisive factor. For most neighbouring countries, New Delhi is an indispensable economic and security partner. Aligning with a Pakistan-China-led bloc risks backlash from India, complications for labour migration, and disruptions to trade flows. Few governments are willing to incur such costs unless the strategic terrain changes dramatically.
Pakistan, however, senses a rare moment of advantage. Its ties with China are at their strongest, engagement with Washington has cautiously revived, and support from Gulf partners has broadened. Islamabad hopes to leverage this diplomatic momentum to reclaim regional relevance after years of isolation and economic instability.
For now, the proposal remains more political signalling than concrete architecture. Whether it evolves into a functioning bloc—or fades like earlier visions of regional unity—depends on how smaller states calculate their risks and how India chooses to respond. In a region defined by mistrust and rivalry, even the possibility of a new alignment is enough to command careful attention.
