The killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, a spokesperson of Inquilab Mancha and a candidate from the Dhaka-8 constituency, has plunged Bangladesh into a fresh wave of political tension and uncertainty at a sensitive moment ahead of the February national elections. Hadi, known for his strong anti-India stance and opposition to former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, was shot dead in broad daylight, triggering outrage, fear, and speculation across the country. Despite the passage of time, the police investigation has yet to yield clear or conclusive results, deepening public suspicion and fuelling political narratives from multiple sides.
As Bangladesh moves closer to the polls, the central question dominating political discourse is straightforward yet deeply contested: who actually benefits from Sharif Osman Hadi’s murder? Analysts and political observers argue that the answer does not lie with the country’s mainstream political players. Neither the now-banned Awami League nor the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), widely considered the frontrunner in the upcoming election, appears to gain any real political advantage from Hadi’s killing. Instead, experts suggest that the true beneficiaries are groups that thrive on instability, communal fear, and political disorder—actors who stand to gain not from a peaceful electoral process, but from chaos and disruption.
Amid the growing controversy, BNP leader and former Member of Parliament Nilofer Chowdhury Moni made a serious allegation that has further complicated the narrative. She claimed that a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader and Supreme Court lawyer, Mohammad Shishir Monir, had twice secured bail over the past two years for Faisal Karim, the man accused of shooting Hadi. Monir, who is also a former central secretary of Islami Chhatra Shibir—the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami—is contesting the February election from the Sunamganj-2 constituency on a Jamaat ticket. These allegations have raised questions about possible Islamist networks operating behind the scenes.
Following Hadi’s shooting on December 12, radical Islamist groups and anti-India voices in Bangladesh began aggressively pushing the claim that the accused shooter had fled to India. This narrative persisted despite repeated statements from Dhaka Police clarifying that they had no evidence to suggest the suspect had crossed into India and no verified information about his current location. Nevertheless, these claims were amplified online and in public discourse, often accompanied by renewed accusations against India and attempts to link the killing to the Awami League, which has since been banned.
The situation escalated further after Hadi succumbed to his injuries days later. Radical groups intensified their anti-India rhetoric, organising protests, chanting slogans, and even targeting Indian diplomatic missions, including the High Commission in Dhaka. At the same time, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus formally contacted New Delhi, seeking cooperation in the event that the accused was found on Indian soil. This official diplomatic approach stood in stark contrast to the inflammatory messaging pushed by Islamist factions within Bangladesh.
Even as law enforcement agencies admitted that they had no concrete leads regarding the suspect’s whereabouts, Inquilab Mancha continued to apply pressure on the Yunus administration. The organisation warned that if justice was not delivered swiftly, it would launch a mass movement aimed at toppling the government. This threat has further heightened fears of political instability and street-level unrest in the run-up to the election.
Political analysts argue that the broader pattern surrounding Hadi’s killing points away from traditional political rivals and instead towards extremist factions. Nahid Helal, a Paris-based geopolitics expert of Bangladeshi origin, has argued that Jamaat and allied radical groups appear to be the real beneficiaries. According to Helal, the murder created a convenient pretext for these groups to intensify attacks on minorities, intimidate journalists and media organisations, target Awami League activists, and, most importantly, undermine or derail the electoral process itself.
Helal also dismissed the argument that the BNP or Awami League would gain politically from Hadi’s death. In his analysis, the BNP’s heavyweight leader Mirza Abbas, who is contesting from Dhaka-8, was already far more popular and politically entrenched than Hadi, who was running as an independent candidate. From this perspective, Hadi did not pose a serious electoral threat. However, the Dhaka-8 seat has also attracted the interest of leaders from Islami Chhatra Shibir, making the removal of Hadi strategically beneficial for Jamaat-linked groups seeking to strengthen their foothold.
Similar conclusions have been drawn by other analysts. Researcher Raja Muneeb, who focuses on geopolitics and national security, pointed out that the major gainers from Hadi’s killing are not mainstream political parties but extremist groups such as Jamaat and the NCP. According to this view, such organisations benefit from disorder and fear rather than from participation in conventional democratic competition.
Survey data appears to support the growing political relevance of Jamaat. A recent survey conducted by a US-based think tank indicated that while the BNP enjoys strong voter support, Jamaat is not far behind in terms of favourability. With the Awami League banned and the Jatiya Party marginalised, Jamaat is now better positioned than before, making the political stakes even higher.
The BNP has continued to highlight what it sees as Jamaat’s possible involvement in Hadi’s killing. Nilofer Chowdhury Moni publicly questioned the background of the accused shooter and the legal support he allegedly received, implying that these connections deserve serious scrutiny. Her remarks, delivered on a Bangladeshi television channel, suggested deep unease about the direction in which the country is heading and reflected broader concerns about law, order, and political accountability.
Beyond individual accusations, commentators have drawn attention to a wider pattern of pre-election violence in Bangladesh. Dhaka-based commentator Marufa Yasmin has written about the growing climate of fear gripping the country, questioning why the safety of ordinary citizens repeatedly becomes secondary during election periods. She pointed to the emergence of a “third force” whenever trust between the two main political blocs collapses—an anti-democratic element that exploits instability to advance its agenda.
Adding an international dimension to the debate, a former Indian diplomat accused Jamaat-e-Islami of acting in alignment with external interests and criticised the Yunus administration for remaining largely silent amid rising anti-India sentiment. According to this view, the current unrest is part of a larger, coordinated effort to destabilise Bangladesh internally while reshaping its regional posture.
Taken together, expert assessments suggest that the murder of Sharif Osman Hadi is less about rivalry between established political parties and more about the strategic use of violence by radical groups seeking to expand their influence. These groups appear to be exploiting the killing, the unresolved investigation, and the charged political atmosphere to fuel anti-India narratives, weaken mainstream parties, and disrupt the electoral process. In this sense, the tragedy surrounding Hadi’s death offers a clearer picture of who stands to gain—not those contesting power through ballots, but those aiming to reshape the political landscape through fear and instability.
