As Bangladesh’s political parties intensify preparations for the February 12 parliamentary elections, a parallel and equally consequential campaign is unfolding under the leadership of interim regime chief Muhammad Yunus. While most parties are focused on winning seats in Parliament, Yunus is spearheading a nationwide push for a referendum on the so-called July Charter, a reform blueprint born out of the 2024 Anti-Hasina protests. On election day, Bangladeshis will not only choose their next government but will also be asked to vote on whether they approve this Charter, which Yunus has dramatically described as being tied to “the birth of a new Bangladesh.”
With the notable exception of Awami League, led by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, almost all political parties are, to varying degrees, gearing up for the February 12 polls amid a backdrop of sharp political rhetoric and recurring violence. Campaigning has reached a fever pitch with barely a month left. Yet, even as parties spar over parliamentary seats, Yunus appears to be preparing for a different kind of verdict from the electorate, warning citizens about the stakes of rejecting the July Charter and urging them to see it as a once-in-a-generation opportunity.
On February 12, voters will face two distinct exercises. One ballot will decide the composition of the next Parliament. The other, a nationwide referendum, will ask a simple question: whether the people accept or reject the July Charter. The referendum offers only two options, “Yes” or “No.” This is despite the fact that major political players such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizens Party (NCP) have all expressed reservations about various aspects of the Charter. Yunus, however, appears determined to push it through regardless of these concerns.
Yunus has gone so far as to suggest that political parties themselves should actively campaign for a “yes” vote. Expressing confidence that no party would dare oppose the Charter openly, he remarked that he did not believe any political group would seek a “no” vote in the referendum. His administration has echoed this message at multiple levels of government, signalling that support for the Charter is being treated almost as a civic obligation rather than a political choice.
The push has been reinforced by Yunus’s close aides. His special assistant, Ali Riaz, told officials at a meeting with the agriculture ministry that the referendum represented a rare and fleeting opportunity. He warned that such a chance would not come again for five or even ten years, urging all sectors of the state to work together to decide the country’s future direction. Reports suggest that Riaz went further, saying that government, semi-government, and autonomous bodies would conduct coordinated campaigns to mobilise support for the referendum. In line with this approach, banners urging people to “vote yes” have appeared across factories, banks, schools, and public spaces.
This aggressive mobilisation has raised uncomfortable questions about the propriety of linking a referendum promoted by an unelected interim administration to a national election taking place amid political chaos and reports of violence against Hindu minorities. Critics argue that the circumstances make it deeply problematic to frame the Charter as a neutral or consensual national choice.
The roots of the July Charter lie in the violent upheaval of mid-2024. What began as student protests against a controversial job quota system in July quickly escalated into a broader uprising against Sheikh Hasina’s long-ruling government. Allegations of authoritarianism, electoral manipulation, corruption, and human rights abuses fuelled the unrest, which was later infiltrated by Islamist elements linked to Jamaat-e-Islami. Protesters demanded Hasina’s resignation, and clashes with security forces turned deadly. By late 2024, Yunus’s interim regime claimed that more than 1,000 people had been killed and thousands injured or detained, with police stations attacked and officers killed.
Hasina, who had ruled since 2009 and secured a fourth term in a disputed 2024 election, fled to India on August 5, 2024, as protesters and Islamist groups stormed her residence. The military intervened, dissolved Parliament, and paved the way for an interim administration. Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist with a long and acrimonious history with Hasina, was installed as Chief Advisor. Proposed by student protest leaders and backed by powerful interests, he was tasked with restoring order and organising new elections. Critics, however, view him as a figure intent on dismantling Hasina’s political legacy.
From the outset, Yunus framed his mission around sweeping reforms to prevent what he called a return to “fascist” rule. In early 2025, his administration set up six reform commissions focusing on the Constitution, elections, the judiciary, public administration, policing, and anti-corruption mechanisms. The Constitution Reform Commission, in particular, addressed issues such as executive overreach, citizenship definitions, and judicial independence. These efforts were presented as foundational to building a “new Bangladesh.”
The July Charter emerged from this process, named after the month when the 2024 protests erupted. It was formalised through the National Consensus Commission, chaired by Yunus himself. Jamaat-e-Islami initially insisted that a referendum on constitutional reforms be held before any election. The BNP, though uneasy, eventually softened its stance. Other groups, including the NCP and several left-leaning parties, boycotted the process, arguing that it lacked legal force and credible guarantees of implementation.
Despite these divisions, the Charter was signed in October 2025 by the National Consensus Commission and 24 political parties, including the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. On November 13, 2025, President Mohammed Shahabuddin issued an implementation order granting the Charter legal weight and tying its core proposals to a referendum. An ordinance issued on November 25 laid out the mechanics of the vote. A simple majority in favour would empower the new Parliament to act as a Constitutional Reform Council and implement sweeping legal and constitutional changes within 180 days.
Substantively, the July Charter is an ambitious 84-point blueprint aimed at overhauling Bangladesh’s political and institutional framework. Nearly half of its proposals would require constitutional amendments. It seeks to expand fundamental rights, strengthen economic, social, and cultural protections, and redefine citizenship from an ethnic “Bangalee” identity to a more inclusive “Bangladeshi” one. It proposes a bicameral Parliament, tighter limits on prime ministerial power, stronger presidential oversight, judicial reforms to curb executive interference, and the revival of the caretaker government system before elections. It also calls for sweeping changes to anti-corruption laws, policing, and electoral rules.
Yet the Charter has drawn sustained criticism. Opponents argue it lacks genuine national consensus, pointing out that it was finalised through closed-door negotiations that excluded parties representing a large share of the electorate. The Awami League has dismissed it as an elite-driven project designed to shield Yunus from accountability rather than build a shared vision. Critics also warn that it is largely symbolic, sidestepping core issues such as secularism and failing to dismantle Bangladesh’s entrenched winner-takes-all political culture.
Legal experts have raised further concerns, noting that the referendum itself may be extra-constitutional, as neither the current legal framework nor the original 1972 Constitution provides for such a mechanism. Concerns over implementation, potential partisan capture, Islamist influence, and the timing of the referendum amid unrest have been widely discussed in Bangladeshi media.
Adding to the controversy is Yunus’s active campaigning for a “yes” vote. Constitutional scholars such as Shahdeen Malik have argued that an interim or caretaker government has no ethical or legal mandate to openly advocate for a particular outcome in an election or referendum. Yunus’s aides counter that the administration, born of the 2024 uprising, has both the right and the responsibility to promote reforms.
As February 12 approaches, Bangladesh finds itself facing two intertwined decisions: who will govern the country, and whether the July Charter will redefine its political future. While political parties battle for power, Yunus and his interim administration are seeking a parallel endorsement of their reform agenda. Whether this gamble secures a lasting legacy or deepens existing divisions will only become clear once the ballots are counted.
