Following the recent US military operation in Venezuela, President Donald Trump has turned his attention toward Greenland, signalling that he wants control of the Arctic territory by any means necessary. Denmark, which governs Greenland despite being vastly smaller in size and military capacity than the United States, has responded by invoking a 1952 Cold War–era directive that authorises its troops to open fire immediately in the event of an attack, without waiting for further orders. Trump’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric has raised alarm across Europe and within NATO, prompting questions about whether Denmark could realistically resist a US military move resembling the Venezuela operation.
In practical terms, Denmark would be unable to stop the United States from taking Greenland by force. The imbalance in military power is overwhelming, and existing legal arrangements further weaken Denmark’s position. A little-known 1951 Cold War agreement already grants the US extensive military access to Greenland, including the right to establish and expand bases with the consent of Denmark and the Greenlandic authorities. This agreement effectively gives Washington a permanent strategic foothold on the island.
The US already maintains a military presence at the Pituffik base in Greenland, with more than 100 personnel stationed there. Under the existing treaty framework, the United States could significantly increase troop numbers and assets on the island without technically violating any agreement. In such a scenario, a gradual build-up of forces could be enough to secure control of Greenland without the need for a full-scale invasion.
Denmark has nevertheless taken Trump’s statements seriously. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s government has publicly warned that Danish forces have standing instructions to respond immediately to any foreign attack on Greenland, including from an ally. The 1952 directive allows troops to engage an invading force without waiting for political or military clearance, reflecting fears from the Cold War era when communication breakdowns were a real concern. Denmark has also announced plans to spend around $13.8 billion to strengthen Greenland’s defences.
Despite these declarations, Denmark’s military limitations remain stark. In terms of global military rankings, the United States sits at the very top, while Denmark is placed far lower. The US has around 1.3 million active military personnel, while Denmark’s total armed forces number only about 17,300, making it the smallest military within NATO. By comparison, Denmark’s entire force is smaller than some single formations within larger armies.
The Danish Army itself consists of roughly 8,000 personnel, which is fewer than a standard infantry division in many countries. The Royal Danish Navy has about 3,500 personnel and operates a small fleet of frigates, with no submarines at its disposal. Its naval manpower is comparable to the crew strength of just two large aircraft carriers elsewhere, underscoring the scale of the disparity.
Denmark’s air power is also limited. The Danish Air Force has around 3,000 personnel and operates approximately 118 aircraft. Its combat fleet includes a mix of ageing F-16 fighter jets and newer F-35 aircraft, many of which are still being inducted. In contrast, the United States deployed more aircraft than Denmark possesses in total during its recent Venezuela operation alone, highlighting how quickly US air superiority could be established.
Geography further complicates Denmark’s defensive posture. Greenland lies nearly 3,000 kilometres from mainland Denmark, making rapid reinforcement extremely difficult. Any meaningful Danish or European military response would take time to assemble and deploy, time that the US would not need.
Military analysts suggest that even if Denmark and sympathetic allies attempted to intervene militarily, any confrontation would be brief and one-sided. US air power could dominate Greenland’s airspace within hours, and naval assets could project force rapidly along the island’s coast. Amphibious assault capabilities would allow American troops to land quickly and secure key locations.
A single large US amphibious assault ship could carry around 1,700 troops, supported by helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft capable of rapid insertion. Such forces would likely focus on swiftly taking Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, to establish control over the island’s political and administrative centre. The combination of speed, scale and technological superiority would leave little room for resistance.
While such a conflict remains hypothetical, it highlights Greenland’s strategic vulnerability and Denmark’s limited capacity to defend it against a superpower. Trump’s interest in Greenland is driven by more than rhetoric. He has repeatedly described the island as critical to US national security, citing its location between North America and Europe and its role in missile defence and Arctic surveillance.
Beyond strategic positioning, Greenland’s vast reserves of critical minerals are also believed to be a major attraction. As the US seeks to reduce reliance on foreign, particularly Chinese, supply chains, control over Greenland’s resources could offer long-term economic and strategic advantages.
With a US president who appears willing to challenge established norms and alliances, Denmark and Greenland face a deeply uncertain future. Rising tensions and aggressive posturing have made it clear that the question is no longer theoretical, forcing both to remain on high alert as global attention turns toward the Arctic.
