Pakistan experienced its most lethal year in more than a decade in 2025, with conflict-related deaths surging by an alarming 74 per cent compared to the previous year, according to data released by the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), an Islamabad-based think tank. The report shows that the sharp escalation in fatalities was driven by a rise in suicide or fidayeen attacks, the widespread availability of advanced weapons originally supplied by the United States and later left behind in Afghanistan, and intensified counterterrorism operations carried out by Pakistan’s own security forces.
PICSS documented a total of 3,413 deaths linked to militant violence and counterinsurgency actions in 2025, a steep jump from 1,950 deaths recorded in 2024. This dramatic increase, reported by the Associated Press, underscores how rapidly Pakistan’s internal security situation deteriorated over the year, making 2025 the deadliest period the country has seen in over ten years.
In many respects, the violence of 2025 highlighted Pakistan’s long-standing policy contradictions coming home to roost. Militant organisations that were once cultivated or tolerated as strategic tools for regional influence have increasingly turned against the state itself. For decades, sections of Pakistan’s security establishment supported jihadist and insurgent groups as part of broader geopolitical calculations, while simultaneously acting as a frontline ally in the US-led war in Afghanistan. That dual approach flooded the region with weapons, training and battle-hardened fighters. Today, the very networks and American-origin arms that emerged from this history are fuelling suicide bombings and insurgent attacks inside Pakistan.
According to PICSS, more than half of those killed in 2025 — around 2,138 people — were militants. This reflects not only the intensity of Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations but also the evolving lethality of militant violence. Many of the suicide attacks recorded during the year involved sophisticated weaponry, significantly increasing their destructive impact.
Even Pakistan’s political leadership has publicly acknowledged the severity of the situation. President Asif Ali Zardari, in his New Year address, referred to the grave security challenges confronting the country, implicitly recognising the scale of the threat posed by resurgent militancy.
Pakistan now finds itself battling what increasingly resembles a two-front internal conflict. Islamist militancy has resurged strongly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while ethno-nationalist insurgency has intensified in Balochistan. This dual pressure has placed enormous strain on the counterinsurgency capabilities of the military under Army Chief Asim Munir, stretching resources and manpower across multiple volatile regions.
One of the most significant trends highlighted by the PICSS report is the growing use of American military equipment by militant groups operating in Pakistan. Abdullah Khan, Managing Director of PICSS, noted that weapons abandoned after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have steadily found their way into the hands of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other armed outfits.
Reports suggest that nearly half a million weapons seized by the Taliban after the US exit have either gone missing, been sold, or been smuggled to militant groups across the region. The Taliban took control of close to a million pieces of US-funded military equipment when they returned to power, and the lack of effective oversight has allowed much of it to enter black markets.
A United Nations report released in February 2025 warned that several extremist organisations, including al-Qaeda-linked groups such as the TTP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and Yemen’s Ansarullah movement, were either directly accessing Taliban-controlled weapons or procuring them through illicit trade networks. This influx of high-grade arms has significantly boosted the operational capacity and firepower of militants targeting Pakistan.
Islamabad has repeatedly raised alarms over the destabilising effect of unaccounted-for US military hardware, arguing that these weapons have worsened insecurity not only within Pakistan but across the broader region.
Another defining feature of 2025 was the sharp resurgence of suicide bombings. PICSS recorded 26 suicide attacks during the year, marking a 53 per cent increase over 2024. These attacks played a central role in driving up the overall death toll and were often aimed at security personnel, military convoys and sensitive installations, particularly those associated with Chinese interests in Balochistan.
The nature of violence in Balochistan has also evolved. Baloch insurgency is no longer limited to male fighters. In a striking development, women from diverse backgrounds have begun taking part in militant actions, reflecting growing anger over what many in the region see as the exploitation of Balochistan’s resources by Pakistan and China.
Earlier in 2025, a woman identified as Banuk Mahikan Baloch carried out an attack on a Frontier Corps patrol vehicle in the Kalat district of Balochistan, killing one person and injuring three security personnel. Such incidents highlight a significant shift in the profile and tactics of insurgent resistance.
In total, PICSS documented 1,066 militant attacks across Pakistan in 2025, with multiple groups, including the TTP, claiming responsibility for a majority of these incidents. The sustained tempo of violence underscores how deeply entrenched militancy has become.
The renewed militant offensive extracted a heavy price from Pakistan’s security forces. According to the report, 667 security personnel were killed in 2025, representing a 26 per cent increase from the previous year and the highest annual toll since 2011. These losses point to the intensity of confrontations between militants and state forces.
Civilian casualties also rose sharply. PICSS recorded 580 civilian deaths, the highest number since 2015. In addition, 28 members of pro-government peace committees were killed. These groups, which cooperate with the state at the local level, have increasingly become targets for militant reprisals.
Militant fatalities themselves formed the largest share of deaths in 2025, with numbers rising by a staggering 124 per cent compared to 2024. This increase was largely the result of intensified operations against the TTP and allied groups. Despite Kabul’s claims that the TTP operates independently of Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers, the group has dramatically escalated attacks on Pakistani forces, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
Abdullah Khan of PICSS noted that the high number of militant deaths reflects both the aggressiveness of Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaigns and a fundamental change in the nature of militant violence. Attacks are becoming more frequent, more coordinated and more lethal.
Overall, 2025 marked a dangerous inflection point for Pakistan’s internal security, a reality even acknowledged by President Zardari. The key question now is whether Islamabad will continue to externalise blame for its domestic violence, particularly by accusing India, or whether it will pursue a broader, more holistic response. As former Pakistani diplomat Maleeha Lodhi has argued, only a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach that combines security measures with socioeconomic reforms, political inclusion and community engagement can hope to address the roots of Pakistan’s deepening crisis.
