As geopolitical rivalries sharpen and conflicts multiply across regions, international attention has once again turned toward Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal—not merely as a deterrent against India, but as a potential variable that could alter global and regional power equations. Among diplomats, security analysts, and intelligence agencies, there is growing unease that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities could become a bargaining chip amid political instability, economic pressure, or strategic realignments, raising the spectre of nuclear technology falling into unsafe or unintended hands.
Veteran Pakistani journalist and political commentator Najam Sethi has argued that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was conceived almost entirely within the context of its rivalry with India. According to him, Islamabad has long recognised that it cannot compete with New Delhi in terms of conventional military strength. As a result, nuclear weapons form the core of Pakistan’s defence doctrine, serving as an equaliser designed to prevent India from exercising overwhelming military dominance. In Sethi’s assessment, the arsenal exists to ensure Pakistan’s survival and strategic autonomy, not to project power beyond South Asia.
Sethi has also rejected claims that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were driven by the idea of creating an “Islamic bomb” or by intentions to threaten countries such as Israel or the United States. However, he concedes that the increasingly volatile situation in the Middle East—particularly uncertainties surrounding Iran—has intensified global scrutiny of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. As regional conflicts deepen and alliances shift, major powers are paying closer attention to how nuclear-capable states outside traditional Western frameworks manage their arsenals.
The deeper concern, Sethi explains, lies not in Pakistan’s direct use of nuclear weapons, but in the possibility of proliferation through indirect means. Several wealthy Muslim-majority nations, especially in the Gulf, possess the financial resources to pursue nuclear capabilities of their own. Western governments fear that under conditions of economic stress, internal political upheaval, or strategic bargaining, Pakistan could one day be pressured—or tempted—to share nuclear knowledge, materials, or technical expertise with another state. Such a development, analysts warn, would pose a severe threat to global security.
Israel, in particular, has historically opposed the emergence of nuclear weapons in any Muslim-majority country and has closely monitored Pakistan’s nuclear programme for decades. As instability in the Middle East grows and Iran’s future remains uncertain, both Israel and the United States are expected to intensify their focus on Pakistan. Policymakers in Washington and Tel Aviv worry that the spread of nuclear technology to new actors would dramatically upset existing balances of power, with consequences that could ripple far beyond the region.
Pakistan’s refusal to adopt a No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy has further fuelled international anxiety. While India has publicly committed to not using nuclear weapons unless attacked first, Pakistan has consistently declined to make a similar pledge. Sethi notes that Islamabad views this stance as essential, arguing that India’s superior conventional forces leave Pakistan with little choice but to retain the option of a first strike. From Pakistan’s perspective, committing to NFU would weaken its deterrence and expose it to the risk of a large-scale conventional assault.
At its core, Pakistan maintains that its nuclear weapons are purely defensive, intended to guarantee national survival rather than enable aggression. Yet from the outside, the picture appears far more complex and unsettling. A country grappling with political volatility, economic challenges, and intense regional pressures—while possessing advanced nuclear capabilities—represents a proliferation risk that cannot be dismissed lightly.
