Several months after torchlight rallies demanding a “fair share” of Teesta river waters swept through all five districts of Bangladesh’s Rangpur division, fresh geopolitical attention has turned to the river once again. China’s Ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, has conveyed his intention to visit the Teesta river project area located close to India’s strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor, often referred to as the Chicken’s Neck. The proposed visit comes at a time when India–Bangladesh water-sharing talks remain stalled and Dhaka’s political tone towards New Delhi has noticeably hardened.
Yao Wen’s planned visit followed a meeting with Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman, held at the Chief Adviser’s Office. After the interaction, the Chinese envoy reportedly informed the Bangladeshi leadership that he would travel to the Teesta project site as part of China’s ongoing engagement with the river management initiative. The development has drawn attention because of the site’s proximity to the narrow Siliguri Corridor, which connects India’s Northeast with the rest of the country and is considered one of New Delhi’s most sensitive strategic vulnerabilities.
The torchlight rallies in northern Bangladesh, held in October, coincided with a large mobilisation in the port city of Chattogram. Protesters demanded the implementation of the China-backed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, arguing that Bangladesh had long been denied an equitable share of the river’s waters. Strategic experts have warned that Beijing’s involvement in the Teesta project, especially against the backdrop of unresolved negotiations with India, carries potential security implications for New Delhi due to the river’s location near the Siliguri Corridor.
According to an official statement shared via the social media handle of Bangladesh’s interim leadership, the Chinese ambassador paid a courtesy call on the National Security Adviser and discussed issues including the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project as well as plans for a proposed Bangladesh–China Friendship Hospital. The statement added that Yao Wen reiterated China’s commitment to completing the technical assessment of the Teesta project at the earliest and confirmed his intention to visit the project area personally.
Since assuming power in August 2024, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus has steadily sharpened its posture towards India. Analysts point to a series of moves that have unsettled New Delhi, including the release of convicted extremists, perceived tolerance of Islamist groups, and increasingly provocative rhetoric on regional issues. Yunus’s remarks on India’s Northeast and on Saarc have been interpreted as signals of a deliberate foreign policy recalibration, drawing Bangladesh closer to China and Pakistan.
On the streets, protests featuring openly anti-India slogans have been allowed to unfold with little restraint, reinforcing the perception that the current administration is willing to accommodate or even encourage such sentiment. Combined with strains in cricketing ties, tighter visa regimes and assertive diplomatic signalling, these developments suggest a conscious effort by Dhaka to adopt a more confrontational stance towards New Delhi across multiple domains.
The Teesta River itself originates in the eastern Himalayas in Sikkim, flows through northern West Bengal, and then enters Bangladesh, where it merges with the Brahmaputra, locally known as the Jamuna. In Bangladesh, the river passes through Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and Kurigram districts, supporting agriculture and livelihoods, particularly during the dry season. For India as well, especially northern West Bengal, the Teesta is a vital water source, making any sharing arrangement politically and economically sensitive.
Negotiations between India and Bangladesh over Teesta water-sharing have dragged on for decades without a final agreement, largely due to concerns raised by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. The prolonged deadlock fuelled frustration in sections of Bangladeshi society, a sentiment that intensified after the fall of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. In the changed political climate, Yunus’s administration has appeared more receptive to Beijing’s overtures.
China has stepped into this vacuum by reviving interest in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, originally discussed during Hasina’s tenure. Beijing has presented itself as a partner capable of executing large-scale river engineering, dredging, embankment construction and reservoir development. Under the proposed master plan, the Teesta would effectively be transformed into an engineered economic corridor, supported by Chinese capital, technology and expertise, with the promise of year-round water availability for Bangladesh’s northern regions.
For Dhaka, Chinese participation is viewed as a practical alternative to the stalled bilateral process with India. For New Delhi, however, it raises red flags. Reports have suggested that Bangladesh has moved to reactivate an old airbase at Lalmonirhat, close to the Siliguri Corridor, with speculation about a possible Chinese role. While Bangladeshi officials have denied any foreign involvement and described the move as serving national needs, concerns persist within Indian strategic circles.
Bangladeshi analysts themselves have acknowledged these sensitivities. Commentators have noted that India is uneasy about the prospect of Chinese personnel gaining a foothold near the Chicken’s Neck under the cover of development projects. Indian strategic thinker Brahma Chellaney has previously warned that shifting the Teesta project towards China and reviving the Lalmonirhat airbase could significantly enhance Beijing’s capacity for surveillance and intelligence-gathering near India’s border.
Against this broader backdrop, Ambassador Yao Wen’s proposed visit to the Teesta project site assumes greater strategic significance. Even if framed purely as a technical or developmental engagement, a visible Chinese diplomatic presence so close to the Siliguri Corridor reinforces New Delhi’s concerns about Beijing’s expanding footprint in South Asia and its growing proximity to one of India’s most critical strategic chokepoints.
