Pungi baji, lungi uthi: Did Uddhav's Sena suffer from Raj Thackeray's Marathi hatred as well


With the BJP-led Mahayuti taking charge of the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, the political standing of the Thackeray family in Maharashtra appears to be facing a decisive decline. Raj Thackeray and his Maharashtra Navnirman Sena once again missed an opportunity to redefine their political relevance, opting instead for divisive rhetoric rather than a governance-oriented campaign. The spillover effect of this approach seemingly damaged the prospects of Uddhav Thackeray and his faction of the Sena as well.

For close to three decades, Mumbai residents were accustomed to seeing the Shiv Sena in control of the BMC, often through alliances but always as a dominant force. That era has now come to an abrupt end. India’s wealthiest municipal body will be governed by the Mahayuti alliance, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. While the Shiv Sena faction headed by Eknath Shinde remains part of the ruling alliance, the outcome marks a clear exit for the Thackerays from an institution that long served as both their political stronghold and a key indicator of their influence in Maharashtra.

With an annual budget of ₹74,427 crore for FY 2025–26—exceeding the yearly budgets of several Indian states—the BMC occupies a unique position in the country’s political and administrative landscape. Although the mayor’s post is largely symbolic, with executive authority vested in the municipal commissioner appointed by the state government, control of the civic body is widely viewed as a demonstration of political dominance in Maharashtra. Against this backdrop, Mahayuti’s victory signals a shift that suggests the Thackerays may be edging toward political marginalisation.

For the Uddhav Thackeray–led Shiv Sena (UBT), which emerged after the Shiv Sena split in June 2022, the BMC elections represented a crucial opportunity to reassert relevance and stage a political comeback. The same held true for Raj Thackeray’s MNS, a party often associated more with street-level aggression and inflammatory language than with sustained engagement on civic and governance issues.

As the campaign entered its final phase, Raj Thackeray drew attention, but largely for reasons that reinforced old criticisms of his politics. Sensing a loss of ground, he appeared to revert to a decades-old playbook, resurrecting the slogan “uthao lungi, bajao pungi,” a thinly veiled dig at South Indian communities. Rather than energising voters, the move seemed to evoke an uncomfortable nostalgia for the divisive politics of his uncle, Bal Thackeray, from the 1960s, without delivering any tangible electoral gains.

This raised a crucial question: did the MNS inadvertently undermine the prospects of Uddhav Thackeray’s Sena as well? The numbers suggest that possibility. The MNS contested 52 wards but managed to win only six, reflecting a strike rate of about 11 per cent. In contrast, the Sena (UBT) achieved a strike rate of roughly 40 per cent, securing 66 of the 164 wards it contested.

Given that Mahayuti’s victory was not a sweeping landslide, even limited tactical support from the MNS could have significantly improved Uddhav Thackeray’s chances. Instead, Raj Thackeray’s party proved more of a liability than an asset, effectively becoming a drag on opposition consolidation. This was particularly striking because Sena (UBT) had consciously attempted to soften its image and focus on inclusive civic issues that did not alienate sections of Mumbai’s diverse population, while the MNS clung to outdated and overtly divisive themes in a city that has clearly evolved.

The MNS’s broader electoral track record further underscores this decline. In nearly two decades of existence, the party has failed to win a single Lok Sabha seat, secured no seats in the 2024 Maharashtra Assembly elections, won just one seat in the 2017 BMC polls, and retained only marginal influence in pockets such as Kalyan-Dombivli.

Ironically, between the two cousins, Raj and Uddhav, it has often been Raj who was perceived as the more charismatic and dynamic leader. The BMC elections offered him a rare chance to reshape his political narrative, shift focus to pressing urban concerns, and appeal to a changing electorate. Instead, he squandered the moment with gimmicks and rhetoric that felt increasingly disconnected from voters’ priorities—symbolised by controversies that distracted more than they persuaded, even drawing unintended associations with figures like Annamalai.

A closer look at the election results suggests that Mahayuti’s success stemmed largely from its emphasis on development and infrastructure, including metro expansion and improved sewage systems, which resonated across South Mumbai and suburban areas. While the alliance did echo themes such as a Hindu-Marathi mayor, it did so with far less aggression than the MNS. Opposition fragmentation also played a role, with the Indian National Congress choosing to contest independently, thereby weakening the collective challenge. A modest voter turnout of just 53 per cent further highlighted urban disengagement.

Speculation naturally follows on whether a different MNS strategy could have altered the outcome. Mumbai’s demographics have changed significantly, with the proportion of Marathi speakers declining from 44 per cent in 1951 to 36 per cent by 2011. Younger voters—more than 30 per cent of the electorate is under 35—show little attachment to nativist rhetoric and tend to prioritise practical civic concerns over identity-based politics. Political observers note that appeals to Marathi asmita now resonate with only a narrow segment of voters, while issues such as jobs, housing affordability, and urban infrastructure dominate public interest.

Had the MNS recalibrated its campaign around these themes, it might have consolidated anti-Mahayuti votes in Marathi-dominated areas such as Dadar, Worli, and parts of Thane. Instead, by persisting with confrontational tactics that have repeatedly failed, the party reinforced perceptions of irrelevance. For the MNS, meaningful “Navnirman” may now need to begin internally, through a cleaner, policy-driven, and forward-looking political approach.


 

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