Over the past several days, the United States has effectively signalled that it now exercises decisive influence over a vast share of the oil reserves across the American continents. This shift has been framed by the Trump administration as part of an informal but far-reaching policy approach that observers have begun calling the “Donroe Doctrine,” a blend of Donald Trump’s name and the Monroe Doctrine articulated in 1823. That original doctrine asserted that the Western Hemisphere lay outside the sphere of European intervention, and the updated version appears to revive that logic in a modern, resource-driven form.
The first clear demonstration of this approach came on January 3, when US special forces carried out a dramatic operation that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and their transfer to the United States. On the same day, President Trump publicly declared that Washington was taking control of Venezuela’s oil reserves, estimated at more than 300 billion barrels, representing a substantial portion of global supply. This move alone marked a radical assertion of authority over one of the world’s most resource-rich nations.
The policy momentum continued just days later. On January 7, the US Coast Guard boarded and seized two merchant vessels linked to Russia’s so-called shadow or ghost fleet, one in the North Atlantic and another in the Caribbean. These tankers are part of an opaque network used by Moscow to move oil while bypassing Western insurance systems and sanctions. By targeting these ships, Washington signalled that it was prepared not only to act against state actors but also to disrupt the informal networks that sustain sanctioned energy exports.
Taken together, these actions amount to a declaration that the United States intends to dominate energy flows throughout the Americas. The Donroe Doctrine, as it is being described, explicitly echoes the Monroe Doctrine’s core principle of excluding rival powers from the region, but it adapts that idea to twenty-first-century geopolitics by focusing on energy, minerals, and strategic control rather than formal colonial influence.
This doctrine aligns closely with Trump’s broader America First agenda, now sharpened to confront two primary strategic rivals, China and Russia. Senior officials have made clear that Washington does not intend to allow critical resources in the Western Hemisphere to fall under the influence of adversarial powers. Oil remains the central lever, and the United States has applied sustained pressure on several of the largest suppliers that feed China’s energy needs.
China, as the world’s largest oil importer, depends heavily on seaborne shipments, importing more than 11 million barrels per day. In recent years, Beijing increased purchases of discounted crude from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, all of which operate under various sanctions and price caps. At different points, China accounted for a majority of Venezuela’s oil exports, the overwhelming share of Iran’s exports, and roughly half of Russia’s outward oil flows.
The removal of Maduro has effectively redirected Venezuelan oil away from China and toward markets under US oversight. Shortly after the operation, Washington announced plans to sell tens of millions of barrels of Venezuelan crude on the global market, with proceeds managed under American control. This shift alone weakens one of China’s key sources of low-cost energy.
Russia’s position is also under strain. US officials argue that Moscow’s oil revenues directly fund its military campaign in Ukraine, making energy exports a strategic target. While Ukrainian strikes have damaged Russian infrastructure, Washington has focused on disrupting the global distribution mechanisms that allow Russian oil to reach buyers. The seizure of shadow fleet vessels and the sanctioning of hundreds of tankers have significantly complicated Russia’s ability to sell crude above imposed price caps.
These measures have also had knock-on effects for Chinese refiners. Sanctions on major Russian producers and transport networks have forced several large Chinese state-owned companies to temporarily halt or reduce purchases of Russian oil due to the risk of secondary sanctions. Although no direct tariffs have been imposed on China for these purchases, the indirect pressure has been substantial.
Iran represents the third pillar of this energy squeeze. Nearly all of Iran’s oil exports flow to China, providing Beijing with another crucial source of discounted supply. Iran now faces escalating US pressure, including military strikes on nuclear facilities and pointed warnings against suppressing domestic unrest. A potential collapse or destabilisation of Iran’s leadership would further undermine China’s access to affordable energy.
So far, reactions to the Donroe Doctrine have been muted. China appears to have quietly reduced its involvement in Venezuela and retains alternative options through OPEC suppliers and significant strategic oil reserves that cushion short-term disruptions. Beijing is also accelerating diversification of its energy mix to reduce long-term vulnerability. These factors may temper the immediate impact but could also make China more cautious in pursuing aggressive moves elsewhere, particularly around Taiwan.
Russia’s response remains less predictable. The seizure of vessels under Russian ownership has already prompted strong protests from Moscow and demands for the release of detained citizens. There is a growing risk that further enforcement actions could escalate into direct confrontation if Russian leadership concludes that critical red lines have been crossed.
As this strategy unfolds, the global energy and security landscape is entering uncertain territory. The Donroe Doctrine represents not just a shift in rhetoric but a tangible reassertion of control through force, sanctions, and strategic pressure. Whether it stabilises American influence or triggers broader conflict remains an open question, as the consequences of this approach continue to ripple outward.
