In a speech delivered on February 17, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that Iran possesses weapons capable of destroying US aircraft carriers, stating that while carriers themselves are powerful machines, even more dangerous are the weapons that could send them “to the bottom of the sea.” The remarks came amid reports that the United States had deployed the aircraft carriers USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford, along with their strike groups, closer to Iran’s operational sphere.
Khamenei did not identify any specific weapon system, suggesting that his statement was intended more as a strategic warning highlighting Iran’s broader anti-ship and area-denial capabilities, particularly in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts therefore interpret the comment as a reference to Iran’s wider missile and naval arsenal rather than a single platform.
Among the most advanced systems Iran claims to possess are the Fattah-class hypersonic missiles developed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Fattah-1, unveiled in June 2023, is described as a medium-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of about 1,400 kilometres and speeds reportedly reaching Mach 13 to Mach 15. It is believed to use a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle designed to evade missile defence systems during the final phase of flight. A newer variant, the Fattah-2, introduced later in 2023, is thought by analysts to incorporate a hypersonic glide vehicle capable of unpredictable flight paths, further complicating interception efforts. Public information about production numbers remains limited, though reports indicate such missiles were used alongside large ballistic salvos during Iranian strikes against Israel in October 2024.
Despite attention surrounding hypersonic weapons, military experts note that Iran’s primary anti-ship strength lies in its extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles. Estimates from defence assessments suggest Iran possesses roughly 1,000 to 1,200 such missiles, forming the backbone of its asymmetric maritime strategy. Many systems are derived from earlier Chinese designs but have been locally upgraded. These include the Noor missile, based on the C-802; the longer-range Qader and Ghadir variants with improved guidance and sea-skimming capabilities; the shorter-range Nasr series; the Ra’ad system derived from the HY-2 Silkworm; and the long-range Abu Mahdi cruise missile, reportedly capable of striking targets up to 1,000 kilometres away. Variants of similar missiles have previously been used by Iran-aligned groups in attacks against commercial shipping and naval targets in regional waters.
In addition to missiles, Iran maintains other tools intended to challenge naval forces, including naval mines, torpedoes launched from submarines, and unmanned aerial and maritime systems designed for swarm attacks. These capabilities are central to Iran’s strategy of denying adversaries freedom of movement in narrow waterways rather than matching conventional naval power directly.
Whether such weapons could successfully sink or severely damage a US aircraft carrier remains uncertain. US carrier strike groups operate layered defence systems that include advanced radar networks, interceptor missiles, electronic warfare capabilities and combat air patrols. Recent engagements in the Red Sea demonstrated these defences when US warships intercepted multiple drone and missile attacks without sustaining damage.
Khamenei’s remarks therefore appear aimed less at identifying a single “carrier-killer” weapon and more at reinforcing Iran’s deterrence narrative — signalling that any confrontation near its waters would expose US naval forces to a complex mix of missile, drone and asymmetric threats, even though the actual effectiveness of such systems against heavily defended carrier groups remains a subject of debate among military analysts.
