Although Iran’s leadership has publicly maintained a united front in rejecting US and Israeli pressure and vowing to continue the conflict, internal strains are becoming increasingly visible in Tehran. The war, widely described by Iranian officials as existential, has exposed disagreements between moderates and hardliners over strategy, diplomacy, and the structure of power.
The death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 intensified these fault lines. Khamenei had long commanded deep loyalty across political, clerical, and military institutions, and his absence triggered a power struggle over succession and wartime decision-making.
Three developments in particular have highlighted the growing discord.
The first involved backlash against President Masoud Pezeshkian after he apologised for Iranian strikes that affected neighbouring Gulf countries. In a televised address, Pezeshkian said Iran had not intended to violate the sovereignty of regional states and described them as “brothers,” while signalling that further attacks would depend on whether Iran itself was targeted from their territory. His remarks drew sharp criticism from hardliners, who viewed the apology as weak and politically damaging. Under pressure, he later withdrew the statement, saying it had been misinterpreted and reaffirming a firm defensive posture.
Senior figures contradicted him publicly. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf argued that regional stability was impossible as long as US bases remained active. Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei said regional states had enabled attacks on Iran and warned that strikes would continue. The military also issued its own warning that US and Israeli bases across the region could be targeted if hostilities persisted.
The second flashpoint was the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new Supreme Leader. His elevation was reportedly backed by hardline clerics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) but faced resistance from reformist and moderate factions. Critics argued that Mojtaba lacked the senior clerical credentials and political experience traditionally associated with the role. Others objected on ideological grounds, saying father-to-son succession conflicted with the anti-monarchical principles of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Some political factions preferred retaining the interim leadership council formed after Khamenei’s death rather than rushing a permanent appointment. That temporary body included Pezeshkian, Mohseni-Ejei, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi. Despite objections, Mojtaba’s close ties to IRGC leadership and influence within its command structure reportedly proved decisive.
The third development has been the growing institutional dominance of the IRGC itself. Analysts say the force is operating with unprecedented autonomy, often overshadowing the traditional clerical hierarchy in shaping military and strategic decisions. Its expanding authority during wartime has reinforced perceptions that real power is shifting toward the security establishment rather than civilian or religious leadership.
Senior clerics reportedly urged the Assembly of Experts to accelerate succession deliberations to prevent a prolonged leadership vacuum. Reports also indicated intense pressure on members during the process, with disagreements over hereditary succession and participation in key meetings exposing further internal friction.
Despite visible divisions, support from the IRGC and hardline clerical blocs ultimately ensured Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment, consolidating control within the security establishment. Observers note that while Iran’s leadership remains publicly aligned in defying the US and Israel, disagreements over governance, legitimacy, and wartime direction are becoming more pronounced beneath the surface.
