Following the disruption of Pakistan’s traditional surveillance and tracking infrastructure during Operation Sindoor, its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is believed to have shifted towards an alternative system based on Chinese EseeCloud-powered CCTV technology. This transition, according to security sources, reflects an attempt to rebuild monitoring capabilities using a decentralised and less traceable surveillance network.
The development came to light after a major operation by the Delhi Police’s Special Cell, which uncovered an alleged interstate espionage, terror, and arms-linked module. Investigators found that the network relied on solar-powered CCTV cameras equipped with Chinese-origin software, raising concerns about external surveillance capabilities operating within sensitive regions.
Authorities revealed that the module had links to the Pakistan-based Khalistani terror outfit Babbar Khalsa International (BKI). The group was reportedly attempting to establish a wide surveillance grid by installing cameras at around 50 strategically significant locations, including railway stations and routes frequently used by the armed forces. The intent appeared to be the collection of real-time movement data and logistical patterns.
Investigations confirmed that at least two such cameras had already been installed—one at Delhi Cantonment Railway Station and another at Sonipat Railway Station. The Sonipat device had reportedly been transmitting live footage for more than two weeks before it was dismantled on March 18, indicating that the network had already begun functioning before being detected.
The sequence of events traces back to intelligence gathered earlier in the year. In January, the G branch of the Border Security Force (BSF) Punjab unit received information from a source in Pakistan regarding ongoing efforts to establish such a surveillance system. This input led to heightened vigilance and eventually contributed to the exposure of the network.
In response to these findings, Indian security agencies have initiated a thorough review and sanitisation of CCTV infrastructure, particularly focusing on systems with potential foreign links. While installations within Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) are governed by strict “Made in India” procurement norms, officials have expressed concern about privately installed cameras near sensitive zones that may use similar foreign technologies.
The issue has also highlighted a broader vulnerability. During Operation Sindoor, intelligence inputs suggested that Pakistani operatives had attempted to gather convoy-related data from toll plazas. The emergence of civilian-operated surveillance systems using externally controlled platforms now presents an additional layer of risk, potentially enabling remote monitoring of critical movement patterns.
As a result, authorities are now working towards tightening surveillance protocols, strengthening oversight on civilian installations near strategic areas, and ensuring that such technological loopholes are addressed to prevent misuse for espionage or hostile activities.
