The ongoing conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran is reshaping global security calculations, with several countries increasingly reconsidering the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring their survival. The war has reinforced a growing perception that non-nuclear states remain vulnerable to external pressure, while nuclear-armed countries are far more difficult to challenge militarily. At the same time, the perceived inability of the United States to fully protect its allies in the Gulf, combined with expanding nuclear capabilities in Russia and China, has further accelerated concerns about strategic imbalance. As a result, countries in both Asia and Europe are now openly debating whether they need nuclear weapons or stronger nuclear protection guarantees.
Iran’s confrontation with major powers has intensified this debate. Even without officially declaring itself a nuclear weapons state, its advanced uranium enrichment programme and missile capabilities have kept the possibility alive. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it could trigger a domino effect across the Middle East, pushing countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to pursue similar capabilities. Beyond the region, nations such as Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Poland are also reassessing their long-term security strategies in light of shifting global power dynamics and weakening trust in traditional alliances.
In contrast to this growing interest in nuclear deterrence, history provides examples of countries that chose to give up their nuclear arsenals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Ukraine, in particular, briefly possessed the world’s third-largest arsenal. However, these countries lacked full operational control over the weapons and faced significant economic and technical challenges in maintaining them. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to transfer its warheads to Russia under the Budapest Memorandum, receiving security assurances and economic support in return. Belarus and Kazakhstan followed a similar path, joining the global non-proliferation framework to gain international legitimacy and avoid isolation.
South Africa presents a different and unique case. It is the only country to have independently developed nuclear weapons and then voluntarily dismantled them. During the apartheid era, it built a small arsenal as a deterrent amid Cold War tensions and regional instability. However, as the geopolitical environment shifted and apartheid began to collapse, the rationale for maintaining these weapons weakened. The government chose to dismantle its arsenal before transitioning to majority rule, aiming to reintegrate into the global community, lift sanctions, and prevent future uncertainty over control of the weapons.
These examples highlight a stark contrast between past and present thinking. Earlier, some nations believed that security could be achieved through diplomacy, international agreements, and integration into the global system. Today, ongoing conflicts and perceived failures of such guarantees are pushing more countries toward the belief that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate form of protection. The experiences of countries like Ukraine, especially in light of later conflicts, have further fueled doubts about whether security assurances without nuclear deterrence are sufficient.
The result is a shifting global landscape where nuclear weapons are increasingly seen not just as tools of power, but as essential safeguards against external threats. While disarmament remains a possibility in theory, current geopolitical realities are making it less attractive in practice. The central dilemma facing many nations today is whether they can rely on alliances and diplomacy for security or whether possessing nuclear capability is becoming an unavoidable necessity.
