At the Jaipur Literature Festival, former Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud weighed in on one of the most debated questions in contemporary criminal law by referring to the prolonged incarceration of Umar Khalid, who has spent nearly five years in jail without his trial being concluded. His remarks brought renewed focus on the constitutional meaning of personal liberty and the limits of preventive detention.
Speaking in conversation with journalist Vir Sanghvi, Chandrachud acknowledged the discomfort and concern caused by long periods of incarceration without trial. He said that while courts are entitled to impose conditions while granting bail to ensure that liberty is not misused, they must simultaneously remain conscious of the accused person’s right to have their case heard and decided within a reasonable time.
When directly asked about Khalid’s continued detention, Chandrachud adopted a careful and restrained tone. He made it clear that he was not criticising the judiciary or the Supreme Court, especially given that he had led the institution until recently. He emphasised that judges are required to decide bail applications strictly on the basis of the material and evidence placed before them, and not on the basis of public opinion, media narratives or retrospective assessments.
At the same time, Chandrachud underlined that the broader constitutional principle is unambiguous. He said that when trials are endlessly delayed, incarceration itself begins to resemble punishment, even though guilt has not been established. Such a situation, he argued, runs contrary to the fundamental premise of criminal justice in a constitutional democracy.
He stressed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution necessarily includes the right to a speedy trial. Chandrachud noted that even special laws that impose stringent conditions on bail cannot override this core constitutional protection. If the justice system is unable to ensure an expeditious trial, continued detention becomes constitutionally suspect.
Chandrachud went on to assert that in circumstances where an early conclusion of the trial is not realistically possible, bail must operate as the norm rather than the exception. He said this principle is central to preserving the balance between the power of the state and the liberty of the individual.
He also rejected the notion that bail decisions should automatically bow to claims of national security. According to him, courts have a duty to carefully examine whether national security concerns are genuinely involved and whether prolonged incarceration is proportionate to the alleged threat. Without such scrutiny, he warned, individuals risk spending years behind bars without any finding of guilt, which undermines the very idea of justice.
Defending the judiciary against sweeping criticism, Chandrachud pointed out that during his tenure, the Supreme Court disposed of nearly 21,000 bail applications, many of which never attract public or media attention. He said this demonstrated that courts routinely engage with bail matters and do not approach them casually or mechanically.
He reiterated that the role of the judiciary is not to echo public outrage or satisfy popular sentiment, but to uphold constitutional principles and maintain institutional balance. According to him, liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of perception or pressure.
Chandrachud concluded by restating the three well-settled grounds on which bail can legitimately be denied: if there is a real risk that the accused may commit a similar offence again, flee from the jurisdiction, or tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. If none of these conditions are established, he said, the accused is constitutionally entitled to bail.
Turning bail into a form of punishment, Chandrachud warned, corrodes both individual liberty and public faith in the justice system, and shifts criminal law away from its constitutional foundations.
