Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif delivered an unusually blunt critique of the United States while addressing Parliament, claiming that Washington had treated Pakistan “worse than toilet paper” by using the country for its strategic goals and then discarding it. He described Pakistan’s alignment with US policy, particularly after 1999 and following the 9/11 attacks, as a serious miscalculation whose effects would linger for years. His remarks were striking, especially at a time when Pakistan has sought to improve ties with the US, including gestures aimed at President Donald Trump.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan positioned itself as a close US partner in defence and security matters. Over time, this relationship deepened, shaped heavily by Pakistan’s rivalry with India and its focus on Kashmir. During the Cold War, Pakistan emerged as a reliable American ally, aided by its strategic location linking South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. This geography made Pakistan valuable to Washington’s regional objectives, while Pakistan’s military establishment leveraged the partnership for financial and military assistance.
The alliance became particularly significant during the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. Pakistan served as a key base for US-backed Mujahideen forces, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) playing a central role in training fighters and facilitating arms transfers. Asif argued that Pakistan’s involvement was driven by political calculations rather than ideology, suggesting that leaders sought legitimacy and superpower backing rather than pursuing religious motives.
Pakistan’s cooperation with the US intensified again after 2001, when it became a frontline state in the US-led War on Terror. The country provided logistical support, access to airbases, and operational assistance for NATO missions in Afghanistan. Asif contended that Pakistan effectively “rented” itself out for two decades, despite knowing that Afghanistan was not directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He also criticised past military rulers, including Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, for entangling Pakistan in external conflicts to secure American support.
According to Asif, these choices produced lasting consequences. He linked Pakistan’s participation in the Soviet conflict to shifts in domestic policies, including changes to the education system that he said still require correction. He further argued that the post-2001 partnership left Pakistan grappling with violence, radicalisation, and economic pressures after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Recent tensions with the Afghan Taliban and attacks attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan were cited as examples of continuing instability.
The broader narrative also touches on Pakistan’s long-standing emphasis on military priorities, shaped by its competition with India. Sustained defence spending and the pursuit of “strategic depth” are portrayed as diverting attention from economic development and governance. This dynamic, coupled with repeated military interventions in politics, strengthened the army’s role in national decision-making while civilian concerns often took a secondary place.
Asif’s comments reflect a wider debate within Pakistan about past foreign policy decisions, the costs of geopolitical alliances, and the balance between security and development. His remarks underscore tensions that have historically marked US-Pakistan relations, even as both countries periodically seek renewed engagement.
