Amid allegations by Mamata Banerjee that Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) could be swapped during storage or transit, the issue has brought renewed attention to the safeguards put in place by the Election Commission of India. The concern arose after polling concluded in West Bengal, with the Chief Minister urging party workers to maintain round-the-clock vigilance outside strongrooms where EVMs are stored until counting day.
However, according to established protocols and expert explanations, swapping or tampering with EVMs inside strongrooms is extremely difficult due to multiple layers of security and transparency built into the process. Once polling ends, EVMs are sealed with paper seals and placed inside secure containers, which are also sealed. These machines are then transported directly to designated strongrooms under strict supervision.
The storage process itself is highly controlled. Strongrooms are locked and sealed in the presence of candidates, their agents, and election observers. Representatives of political parties are allowed to place their own seals on the locks, ensuring that any unauthorized opening would be immediately noticeable. In addition, candidates and their agents are permitted to stay nearby and maintain a continuous watch on the strongrooms until counting begins, with necessary arrangements provided for them.
Security at these facilities is multi-layered. Armed personnel guard the strongrooms round the clock, while CCTV cameras and video recording systems continuously monitor the premises. Any movement around the storage area is documented, and access is strictly restricted. Importantly, the strongrooms are opened only on the day of counting, again in the presence of candidates, their representatives, and election officials, ensuring that the seals are verified before any EVM is handled.
The transportation of EVMs is also tightly regulated. As outlined by former Chief Election Commissioner S. Y. Quraishi, the movement of machines from polling stations to strongrooms is treated as a critical operation. Vehicles used for transport are monitored, often equipped with tracking systems, and candidates are allowed to follow these vehicles to ensure transparency. The entire process—from sealing at polling booths to arrival at storage centres—is documented and, in many cases, videographed.
Additional guidelines issued by the Election Commission mandate that political parties must be informed in advance about any movement of EVMs. Representatives can observe each stage, including transportation, storage, and eventual retrieval for counting. When EVMs are taken out of strongrooms on counting day, the process is again recorded, and party agents are present to verify that seals remain intact.
Given these safeguards, experts maintain that any attempt to swap or tamper with EVMs would require breaching multiple independent layers of security, including physical seals, surveillance systems, armed protection, and the presence of political representatives. Each stage is designed to ensure that no single entity can manipulate the process without detection.
While political concerns and vigilance around elections are not uncommon, the procedural framework established by the Election Commission is intended to ensure the integrity of the voting process. The combination of transparency, physical security, and continuous monitoring makes large-scale manipulation within strongrooms highly improbable under existing protocols.
